Convenient divestments
Stakes passed to relatives, managers or new holding companies around a designation, while the former owner stays visible.
A sanctions evasion investigation starts when a counterparty passes list screening but something still does not add up: an owner who sold out a week before a designation, a distributor in a third country with no visible customers, a vessel that goes dark mid-voyage. We research the open record behind the names and show whether a designated person still sits behind the deal.
A sanctions evasion investigation uses public and licensed sources to find designated persons who own, control or benefit from a counterparty without appearing on its documents. Analysts rebuild ownership chains, apply the OFAC 50 Percent Rule in the aggregate, test intermediaries, trade routes and vessels against known evasion patterns, and grade each finding. Your compliance and legal teams decide whether to proceed, block or report.
Exposure is a designated person behind your counterparty, whether or not anyone hid it. Evasion is a deliberate effort to hide that link. The research overlaps, but the questions differ.
Exposure cases ask a structural question: does a blocked person own enough of this company, alone or together with others, for the company to be treated as blocked, or do they control it in other ways? They arise in onboarding, trade finance and supplier reviews, often with no wrongdoing involved.
Evasion cases ask whether someone is hiding the link: ownership moved to relatives or new shell companies, goods routed through intermediaries, documents that leave out the real end user. They often start from a red flag or a match the PEP and adverse media screening review could not clear on identity alone.
Under OFAC guidance, an entity owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly and in the aggregate, by one or more blocked persons is itself blocked, even if it is not on any list.
OFAC's guidance of 13 August 2014 treats as blocked "any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons" (OFAC 50 Percent Rule guidance). The rule covers ownership only: OFAC says it "speaks only to ownership and not to control", and it advises caution with non-blocked entities in which blocked persons hold significant ownership or that they may control by other means (OFAC FAQ 398).
| Typical scenario | Effect under the rule | What the research has to establish |
|---|---|---|
| Two designated persons each hold 25% | Aggregate 50%: the entity is blocked | Every shareholder in each layer, and whether each is designated |
| A blocked holding owns 60% of a parent, which owns 60% of your counterparty | Indirect ownership: the counterparty is blocked | The full chain, with the percentage at each step from registers and filings |
| A designated person holds 30% and chairs the board | Not blocked by ownership, but control is a risk to weigh | Board seats, signatory powers, management roles and public statements |
| Shares moved to a relative or new company around a designation | Depends on whether the transfer was real | Dates, prices, who the new owner is and whether the old owner still acts for the company |
Where registers are thin, ownership work runs alongside our beneficial ownership investigations.
Most evasion patterns leave public traces: company records, trade data, websites, vessel tracking and media. Each red flag below is a question we test, not a conclusion.
Stakes passed to relatives, managers or new holding companies around a designation, while the former owner stays visible.
New traders with residential or shared addresses, little web presence and no history in the goods they handle.
Shell company investigations →End users, consignees or payers that differ between documents, or a sanctioned party left out of paperwork it clearly belongs in.
Goods shipped through transit hubs with no commercial logic, or payments from a country or company not named in the deal.
Gaps in vessel tracking signals, ship-to-ship transfers, recent changes of flag, name or manager, and opaque ownership of the ship.
Directors, phones, domains or addresses shared with designated entities: often the strongest link to a new front.
US agencies describe the same patterns repeatedly: hidden parties in documents, third-country intermediaries and deceptive shipping. Non-US companies can be liable too.
Five steps, from the red flag your team raised to a graded memo your sanctions officer and counsel can rely on.
You receive a sourced memo with an ownership chart and a red-flag table. Focused cases take from 10 business days; the legal call stays with your counsel.
The memo gives the answer, an ownership chart with sources, a table of red flags tested and open questions for the counterparty. A single ownership question can sometimes be closed in a business day; a focused case takes from 10 business days, and a multi-country network up to about a month. Urgent work costs 50% more, and if we miss the agreed date the fee goes down.
Counterparties that stay high risk can be watched for new designations and ownership changes through counterparty monitoring. Sanctions work is one of the OSINT services for compliance and trade teams that also cover third-party due diligence.
Share the names, the deal or shipment, the red flag and your deadline. We reply with a scope, a delivery date and a fixed quote.
We can test it against the record: transfer dates and any price in registers and filings, the son's age, career and means, and whether the father still acts as director, signatory or spokesman. The memo grades the evidence that control really changed. Whether to proceed is your counsel's call.
Under OFAC guidance ownership is aggregated, so two blocked persons holding 25% each reach 50% and the entity is treated as blocked. Our part is the evidence: each layer traced in its home register or filings, the percentage at every step, the date of each record and any gaps where a register is closed. Your legal team applies the rule to that chart.
We check the buyer's age, address, website and trading history, who owns and runs it, and who the paying company is. We also look for directors, addresses or phone numbers shared with designated entities. The result shows which recognized red flags are present and how strong each one is.
Because US agencies say non-US companies can be liable for causing US persons to violate sanctions, for example by routing payments through the US financial system or leaving a sanctioned party out of documents. A dollar payment or a US-origin component can bring a deal into scope. Your lawyers decide what applies; we show who really stands behind the counterparty.
No. We report findings only to you. Blocking, rejecting and reporting decisions belong to your compliance team and counsel under your own obligations. We never contact the customer or anyone connected to it, so your options stay open.
Sources checked 10 October 2026. Figures about third-party firms and tools are as published by them or by the cited source on that date.